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CASE DIGESTS
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW:

Fair Trial

Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
Sheppard was convicted in 1954 in the Court of Common Pleas
of Cuyahoga County, Ohio for the second-degree murder of his
wife. His trial was preceded and pervaded by publicity. A proceeding for a writ of habeas corpus was instituted in the federal
court for relief from confinement contending that because of inflammatory publicity the petitioner was deprived of a fair trial.
The district court found five separate violations of petitioner's
constitutional rights, viz., failure to grant a change of venue or a
continuance in view of the newspaper publicity before trial; inability to maintain impartial jurors because of publicity during
trial; failure of the trial judge to disqualify himself although there
was uncertainty as to his impartiality; improper introduction of lie
detector test testimony; and unauthorized communications to jury
during their deliberations. 231 F. Supp. 37 (S.D. Ohio 1964). A
divided court of appeals reversed, holding that the petitioner had
failed to sustain the burden of demonstrating the unconstitutionality of his trial. 346 F.2d 707 (1965). The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari.
Held: Judgment reversed and case remanded to the district
court with instructions to issue the writ and order that Sheppard
be released from custody unless recharged within a reasonable
time. The state trial judge's failure to insulate the proceedings
from the inherently prejudicial publicity which saturated the community, and his failure to control disruptive influences in the courtroom deprived Sheppard of the chance to receive a fair hearing
consistent with the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Sheppard was denied due process by the trial judge's refusal to
take precautions in three fundamental areas.
First, the judge should have adopted stricter rules governing
the use of the courtroom by newsmen. The Court pointed out that
bedlam reigned at the courthouse during the trial and newsmen
took over practically the entire courtroom, hounding most of the
participants in the trial, especially Sheppard. A press table was
erected for reporters inside the bar and the number of reporters
allowed in the courtroom was not limited. The reporters clustered
within the bar made confidential talk among Sheppard and his
counsel almost impossible during the proceedings. During recesses
trial exhibits were handled and photographed by newsmen. Their
movement in and out of the courtroom made it difficult for the
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witnesses and counsel to be heard. In Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532
(1965), it was held that the presence of the press at judicial proceedings must be limited when it is apparent that the accused
might otherwise be prejudiced or disadvantaged.
Second, the trial judge should have insulated the witnesses and
jury. Prospective witnesses were interviewed by newspapers and
radio stations at will, and in many instances their testimony was
disclosed before they testified in court. During deliberations the
jurors were permitted to hold unmonitored telephone conversations
with persons outside the jury room.
Third, the judge should have made some effort to control the release of leads and gossip to the news media by the police, witnesses, and the counsel for both sides. The prosecution repeatedly
made evidence available to the press which was never offered in
the trial. For example, publicity about Sheppard's refusal to take a
lie detector test came directly from police officers. Much of the
"evidence" disseminated in this manner was clearly inadmissible,
and the Supreme Court observed that the exclusion of such evidence in court is rendered meaningless when a news media makes
it available to the public. Much of the material printed or broadcast during the trial was never heard from the witness stand, such
as the charges that Sheppard had purposely impeded the murder
investigation; that he was a perjurer; that he had sexual relations
with numerous women; that his slain wife had characterized him as
a "Jekyll-Hyde"; that he was "a bare-faced liar" because of his testimony as to police treatment; and that a woman convict claimed
Sheppard to be the father of her illegitimate child. Effective control of these sources, which the Supreme Court found to be within
the trial judge's power, might well have prevented the divulgence
of inaccurate information, rumors, and accusations that made up
much of the inflammatory publicity. The judge should have at
least warned the newspapers to check the accuracy of their accounts, and, further, should have sought to alleviate this problem
by imposing control over the statements made to the news media by
counsel, witnesses, and especially the police.
Had the judge, the other officers of the court, and the police placed
the interest of justice first, the news media would have soon learned
to be content with the task of reporting the case as it unfolded in
the courtroom-not pieced together from extra-judicial statements.
...If publicity during the proceedings threatens the fairness of
the trial, a new trial should be ordered. But we must remember
that reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those remedial
measures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception. The
courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect
their processes from prejudicial outside interferences. Sheppard
v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362-63 (1966).

CASE DIGESTS
Since the state trial judge did not fulfill his duty to protect
Sheppard sufficiently from the massive, pervasive, and prejudicial
publicity that attended his prosecution and thus deprived him of
a fair trial, the Court found it unnecessary to decide two other
questions raised by the petitioner. Because the precautions outlined would have been sufficient to guarantee Sheppard a fair
trial, the Court refused to consider what sanctions might be available against a recalcitrant press. For a discussion of the proposed
solutions to the problem of trial by newspaper see 44 NEB. L. REV.
614 (1965). Likewise, the charges of bias made against the trial
judge who reportedly told a national newswoman "It's an open
and shut case... he is guilty as hell" were avoided.

CONTRACTS:

Business Coercion

McCubbin v. Buss, 180 Neb. 624, 144 N.W.2d 175 (1966).
The plaintiff was the general manager of Goodrich Dairy and
the defendant was the president. The two parties (the primary
stockholders of the closed corporation) had entered into an agreement dated January 20, 1959, which required a stockholder to give
first option for the sale of stock to the dairy and second option to
the other stockholders. They also agreed that the dairy would purchase the stock of a deceased stockholder. A change in the proportionate interests of the stockholders occurred and the defendant became the majority stockholder. On several occasions the defendant
discussed the stock option agreement with the plaintiff and it was
his suggestion that they discharge the contract by a new agreement.
When they were unable to agree, the defendant threatened to fire
the plaintiff if he did not permit the discharge of the contract.
The plaintiff then complied with the demand and the contract was
discharged. He was later fired by the defendant. The plaintiff
sued for recission of the new agreement alleging business coercion.
The district court held for the defendant and the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
The main contention of the defendant was that a threat to do
what one has a legal right to do cannot constitute duress. In support of this proposition the defendant cited CarpenterPaper Co. v.
Kearney Hub Pub. Co., 163 Neb. 145, 78 N.W.2d 80 (1956); Malec v.
ASCAP, 146 Neb. 358, 19 N.W.2d 540 (1945); and Kunkel Auto
Supply Co. v. Leech, 139 Neb. 516, 298 N.W. 150 (1941). The court
in reply stated that if these cases implied that the threat would not
be wrongful unless there would be an independent liability for the
threatened act, such an implication was an overstatement of the
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law. "An unjust and inequitable threat is wrongful, although the
threatened act would not be a violation of duty in the sense of an
independent actionable wrong in the law of crimes, torts, or contracts." 180 Neb. at 628, 144 N.W.2d 175, 178. The court may have
created some confusion in that it is not clear whether the principle
in the cases cited by the defendant has been modified, or is merely
distinguishable from the instant case and situation. The result that
the court reached in McCubbin can be explained without creating a
conflict with the three cases cited by the defendant. The principle
that seems consistent in all these cases is that it is not wrongful to
threaten an act in pursuance of an existing right; for example, it
would not constitute illegal duress to threaten suit if someone continued to trespass on your land after being warned. It would be
wrongful, however, to threaten suit for trespass to create or to
vitiate certain rights collateral to the trespass, such as coercing
someone to sign a new contract or permit nullification of an existing contract.
In the instant case the defendant threatened to fire the plaintiff. From the evidence presented it appears that he may have had
a valid right to do so, but he should not have the right to threaten
plaintiff's job for the purpose of vitiating his rights (under the
stock option agreement) which were wholly collateral to defendant's right to fire employees. An important distinction, not set out
by the court, is that it is not wrongful to threaten action to enforce
existing rights, but it is wrongful to threaten action for the purpose of creating new or vitiating old rights. Therefore, there is no
necessary conflict between the earlier Nebraska decisions and the
McCubbin case.
CONTRACTS:

Installment Sales

Engelmeyer v. Murphy, 180 Neb. 295, 142 N.W.2d 342 (1966).
The plaintiff purchased a rotary hoe from the defendant on
October 6, 1965. The plaintiff executed a contract which provided
for a down payment and the payment of the balance of the purchase price in installments. The time price differential included in
the balance of the purchase price was in excess of nine per cent
simple interest but within the maximum rate prescribed by NEB.
REv. STAT. § 45-338 (Supp. 1965). The plaintiff contended that this
act violated NEB. CONsT. art. 1, § 16, which prohibits the passage of
a bill of attainder, ex post facto law or law impairing the obligation
of contracts. The plaintiff also alleged that the act constituted a
special law regulating interest where a general law could be made
applicable, and that the act presented an unreasonable classification.

CASE DIGESTS
The 1964 amendment to NEB. CONST. art. 3, § 18, which led to the
passage of section 45-338, allows the legislature to ". . . separately
define and classify loans and installment sales, to establish maximum rates within classifications of loans or installment sales which
it establishes, and to regulate with respect thereto." The lower
court held that the act was constitutional.
On appeal, held: judgment affirmed. The court reasoned that
in interpreting a constitutional amendment all the circumstances
leading to its adoption should be considered. Since the legislature
clearly expressed its intent by including the language "notwithstanding any other provisions of this Constitution," in the amendment, the court rejected the plaintiff's argument based upon art. 1,
§ 16. The court stated: "The amendment should not be construed
so as to defeat its evident purpose, but rather so as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it was aimed."
Engelmeyer v. Murphy, 180 Neb. 295, 299-300, 142 N.W.2d 342, 345
(1966).
Plaintiff's argument that the act created an unreasonable
classification because it did not require the seller to retain the title
to or a lien upon the goods was rejected. The court said that this
classification was more general and thus more reasonable than if
the seller was required to retain the title to or a lien upon the
goods.
This case removes all uncertainty from installment sales contracts in Nebraska entered into subsequent to May 24, 1965, provided the contracts conform to the act. However, the case is not
so clear with respect to actions based upon previous installment
sales acts. These actions are now governed by NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 25-205 (Reissue 1964), which requires that any contract sought to
be nullified because of the unconstitutionality of the statute relied
upon must be brought within one year of the decision declaring the
law unconstitutional or within one year of November 23, 1963,
whichever date is later. The 1959 Installment Sales Act was declared unconstitutional in Elder v. Doerr, 175 Neb. 483, 122 N.W. 2d
528 (1963), which was decided on June 28, 1963. Thus, actions
based upon the unconstitutionality of the 1959 act may no longer
be brought. The same result is true with respect to the 1963 Installment Sales Act. The 1963 act was declared unconstitutional in
Stanton v. Mattson, 175 Neb. 767, 123 N.W. 2d 844 (1963), which was
decided on October 18, 1963. Since both laws were declared unconstitutional prior to November 23, 1963, the latest date an action
based upon the unconstitutionality of these two previous acts could
have been brought was November 23, 1964.

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 45, NO. 4 (1966)

842

It now appears that the Nebraska time sales dilemma has
finally been solved. All contracts based upon the 1965 act are
valid and all actions based upon the invalidity of the two previous
acts can no longer be brought because of section 25-205.
TORTS:

Guest Statute

Davis v. Landis Outboard Motor Co., 179 Neb. 391, 138 N.W.2d 474
(1965).
Plaintiff was aboard a motorboat which stalled on the Missouri
River. The pilot called a repairman, who fixed the boat and piloted
it back to the landing because it was then dark and the trip was
very dangerous at night. Plaintiff was told that she was to ride
back in an automobile with the repairman's wife to avoid the
hazardous river journey. The repairman's wife lost control of the
vehicle on a sharp curve, and plaintiff was injured in the ensuing
accident. The trial court found as a matter of law that plaintiff
was a guest in the automobile in which she was riding and that
defendant driver was not guilty of gross negligence. Recovery was
thereby precluded under Nebraska's "guest statute," NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 39-740 (Reissue 1960). On appeal, held: judgment affirmed.
The decision may easily be defended as a literal application of
the guest statute. That statute states that a "guest" is " . . . a
person who accepts a ride in any motor vehicle without giving
compensation therefor ... ." In this case it did not appear that
the plaintiff paid for her ride nor that the repairman's bill to the
boat pilot included a separate item attributable to the plaintiff's
transportation. The court cited the rule that
"A person riding in a motor vehicle is a guest if his carriage confers only a benefit upon himself and no benefit upon the owner or
operator except such as is incidental to hospitality, social relations,
companionship, or the like, as a mere gratuity. However, if his
carriage contributes such tangible and substantial benefits as to
promote the mutual benefits of both the passenger and owner or
operator, or is primarily for the attainment of some tangible and
substantial objective or business purpose of the owner or operator,
he is not a guest." Davis v. Landis Outboard Motor Co., 179 Neb.
391, 395-96, 138 N.W.2d 474, 478 (1965), citing Born v. Estate of
Matzner, 159 Neb. 169, 65 N.W.2d 593 (1954).

The court concluded that defendants would receive no benefit by
having the plaintiff return by car rather than by boat and that
"the transportation was furnished plaintiff through a desire to
render assistance to a lady who would otherwise be forced to undertake the trip home under circumstances involving considerable danger." Id. at 397, 138 N.W.2d at 479.

CASE DIGESTS
The rule quoted above is broad enough that the court might
have reached a different conclusion, however, by approaching the
guest statute with a different philosophy. Since that statute operates harshly to deny recovery to injured plaintiffs, it would
seem reasonable to limit its effect to those situations which either
present the danger of collusion among family members, or which
arise outside the context of a business transaction in which tangible
compensation flows to the defendant.
A stronger case for holding the guest statute inapplicable
would have been presented had the repairman been unable to fix
the boat, and the boatman had been injured while riding back in
the repairman's automobile, as an alternative to being stranded
overnight on the river. But to allow recovery even in this hypothetical situation would have required the court to take the position that business or commercial transactions cannot be divorced
from attendant social dealings. That is, a customer expects certain courtesies from those he patronizes, which any enterprising
businessman provides not so much out of altruism as out of
business necessity. Although such a ride may be considered a social
gesture, it would arise in the context of business dealings and could
not as a practical matter be separated from them. The benefit is
not direct remuneration for the transportation, but the patronage of
the customer. Although the abstract good will of unascertained,
prospective customers may not be a benefit sufficiently tangible
to avoid the guest statute, it could be said that cementing relations
with an actual, present customer by providing those services, such
as transportation, which are normally expected to be a part of the
commercial transaction, does result in a tangible benefit to the defendant as proved by the money he receives.
The proposed result in the hypothetical case would conform to
the doctrine of Van Auker v. Steckley's Hybrid Seed Corn Co., 143
Neb. 24, 8 N.W.2d 451 (1943). In that case the plaintiff had been
provided free transportation in order that he might assist in defendants' sales promotion booth, and it was held that he was not
barred by the guest statute. The result would be reconcilable with
Born v. Estate of Matzner, 159 Neb. 169, 65 N.W.2d 593 (1954), in
which a member of a church guild, injured while traveling to a
guild conference with the pastor of the church, was denied recovery under the guest statute. In that case there was no direct commercial transaction between the pastor and the plaintiff or the
guild.
The present case is also distinguishable from the hypothetical,
for here the plaintiff did have a ready alternative to traveling

844

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 45, NO. 4 (1966)

with the defendant: she could have returned on the boat. It could
be said that the repairman's "social-business" obligation to provide
alternative transportation on his return trip ended when he fixed
the boat. This may have been an important consideration in the
case, for the court stated that "Nothing appears to indicate a benefit
would occur to the defendants to have the plaintiff return by car
rather than by boat." Davis v. Landis Outboard Motor Co., 179
Neb. 391, 397, 138 N.W.2d 474, 479 (1965). However, the court did
not indicate that the result would have been different had the boat
been inoperable. It said the defendant was motivated by hospitality, which conclusion might also apply had the plaintiff been
stranded.
The unique factual situation presented in the case limits its
stare decisis effect; indeed, the court has stated that whether a person riding in a motor vehicle is a guest should be decided on the
particular facts of each case. Van Auker v. Steckley's Hybrid Seed
Corn Co., supra. The importance of the case lies in its reflection of
the court's attitude toward construction of the guest statute. The
holding may represent an unfavorable reaction to the argument
that a plaintiff whose transportation was furnished in the context
of a business transaction, as a service normally expected in that
situation, should escape the burden of proving gross negligence.
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